Generally it means that even the
severely reduced number of warheads deployed in our arsenal would not --
if they were needed in a crisis -- be available for use. If that in
fact took place -- with countries hostile to the US having arsenals in
excess of the US force -- it would probably be in irresistible
invitation to them to attack.
Former Senator Chuck Hagel, nominated to be Secretary of Defense, is
also a signatory of what is known as the "Global Zero" plan. It calls
for the United States and Russia to begin comprehensive nuclear arms
negotiations in early 2013 to achieve zero nuclear weapons worldwide by
2030 in four phases. The Global Zero plan first would remove all US tactical nuclear
weapons from US combat bases in Europe to storage facilities in the
United States. However, while these tactical US weapons would no longer
be able to defend Europe and NATO, Russians weapons would be able to
attack all of Europe in a relatively short time -- launching weapons
from bases in Russia, where they would be stored, reconstituted and
redeployed. Given the nature of such weapons systems, the verification
of such efforts would be extremely difficult, if not impossible. The real eye-opener is that the 1,000 ceiling for the US would include our tactical nuclear weapons and stored weapons for reserve emergencies, and
the currently deployed 1,550 weapons. The implication is that Hagel is
pushing an 80% cut in overall US deployed weapons. If done
proportionately, that would involve a reduction to fewer than roughly
300 total deployed strategic nuclear warheads, a level less than China,
and less than India and Pakistan combined. This further signals the elimination of the US strategic nuclear
Triad (air, sea and land) -- 300 accountable warheads would enable the
deployment of a limited bomber or submarine or IBM leg of
our nuclear deterrent, but certainly not all three legs. This would have
the effect, by virtually eliminating all serious deterrent capability
to our adversaries, of massively increasing the instability of the
international security environment -- a dramatic reversal of the
promises made within the New START Treaty ratification process, in which
enhancing and maintaining strategic stability was one of the
cornerstones of the US Nuclear Posture Review. By quickly withdrawing our tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, we
would be emasculating the extended deterrent umbrella which now covers
Europe, and as a result seriously weaken the defense ties to our allies
and friends across the Atlantic. There would also be a corresponding
weakening of our deterrent umbrella over the Republic of Korea, Taiwan,
and Japan, just at a time when these three nations, and others, are
threatened by an expanding North Korean missile and nuclear weapons
capability and a major modernization program by China of its nuclear
weapons. The result, based on reasonable mid-point estimates of the
current PRC arsenal, would be a Chinese deployed nuclear arsenal in
excess of that deployed by the United States, to say nothing of what
Peking could deploy in the near and intermediate future. The Global Zero plan also calls for "de-alerting" our nuclear
weapons. That would mean any number of things, but generally it means
even the severely reduced number of warheads in our deployed arsenal
would not, in a crisis, be available for use if they were needed. The
warheads might be removed from their missiles or bombers; they might be
disabled and stored remotely -- requiring many hours, days, or longer to
be redeployed. Previous administrations, as well as the current government, have in
various ways discussed and considered such a move. In every instance,
de-alerting has been firmly rejected. First, the proposal is totally
unverifiable. Second, it is highly destabilizing: in a crisis, there
would be a race to re-alert and rearm, making the first and sudden use
of nuclear weapons a greater or more likely possibility. Third,
de-alerting solves no "nuclear" problem, whether in concerns abut
proliferation, threats of an electro-magnetic pulse [EMP] attack, or any
other deterrent or arms control requirement. The second phase of the Global Zero plan would occur from 2014-2018.
In a multilateral framework, the US and Russia would agree to reduce to
500 total warheads each, to be implemented by 2021. All other countries,
including China, Pakistan, North Korea and others, would freeze their
nuclear stockpiles until 2018, followed by proportionate reductions
until 2021 -- irrespective of whether the US deployed arsenal was
smaller and less effective than many other countries. If in fact that
took place — with nations hostile to the US having arsenals in excess of
the US force -- it would be the first time in the history of the
nuclear age that such an event took place, and probably an irresistible
invitation to them to attack. Moreover, this plan assumes that a comprehensive verification and
enforcement system will have been established -- including agreed-on
no-notice, on-site inspections, and that safeguards on the civilian
nuclear fuel cycle would be strengthened to prevent their being diverted
to build weapons. The final two phases would include a "binding" 'Global Zero Accord'
between 2019-2023, signed by all nuclear capable countries, for the
phased, verified, proportionate reduction of all nuclear arsenals to
zero total warheads by 2030. The whopping loophole in this plan is that
any nation deeming itself not nuclear-capable could opt out of such an
agreement, then be completely free to surprise the world with a nuclear
arsenal once all the major powers had eliminated theirs. Between 2024-2030, finally, there would be a complete "phased,
verified, proportionate dismantlement of all nuclear arsenals to zero
total warheads by 2030," with an accompanying comprehensive verification
and enforcement system prohibiting the development and possession of
nuclear weapons. Apart from the "Alice in Wonderland" nature of this proposal, there
is the sense that its advocates share a less than serious understanding
of both the nature of US deterrence needs, and the geopolitical balance
between the United States and Russia, not amenable to international or
treaty law.
