again made the case for U.S. military action against the reactor,” Mr.
Cheney wrote about a meeting on the issue. “But I was a lone voice.
After I finished, the president asked, ‘Does anyone here agree with the
vice president?’ Not a single hand went up around the room.”
Two of Cheney's closest advisers were David and Meyrav Wormser. David resigned to protest the Annapolis process (if it can be called that) in November 2007.
two decades, we have called on Israel to take risks for peace and make
painful concessions so that it will be accepted more broadly and solidly
by the international community. And yet, after two decades, the voices
questioning Israel’s very right to exist even in Europe are louder than
ever. Polls there show that even the populations of even our closest
allies revile Israel and Israelis more than even Iran or North Korea.
The prospects that this time will be different and that we will see
real progress follow Annapolis, and that all these trends will be
reversed, are bleak for several reasons. First, the concept behind
Annapolis was divorced from the President’s forward strategy of freedom.
Second, the Fatah leadership is so irredeemably weak that it cannot
deliver. Third, we are ignoring the danger of the situation in Gaza.
Fourth, the Annapolis framework “regionalized” the Palestinian issue
when the historical record of regionalization of conflicts is tragic and
violent. Finally, the Palestinian issue is not our highest national
priority in the current strategic environment. Yet, it
disproportionately occupies our attention at the cost of displaying
commitment to more important causes, such as Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, and
North Korea. In short, Annapolis failed to emerge from, and thus
advance, our national interests.
David and Meyrav Wormser (they're married to each other) were the people who told the World that the Bush administration had given Israel a green light to strike Syria
during the Second Lebanon War in 2006. If Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
K. Olmert had the guts to attack Syria in 2006, there may not have been a
need to take out its nuclear reactor in 2007.
Did the administration expect Israel to attack Syria?
"They hoped Israel would do it. You cannot come to another country
and order it to launch a war, but there was hope, and more than hope,
that Israel would do the right thing. It would have served both the
American and Israeli interests.
"The neocons are responsible for the fact that Israel got a lot of
time and space… They believed that Israel should be allowed to win. A
great part of it was the thought that Israel should fight against the
real enemy, the one backing Hizbullah. It was obvious that it is
impossible to fight directly against Iran, but the thought was that its
strategic and important ally should be hit."
As Defense Secretary during the first Gulf War, Cheney presented
David Ivry, the commander of Israel's Air Force when the IAF took out
Iraq's nuclear reactor, with a satellite image of the former Osirak
reactor site, and a note of thanks for making America's job easier in
the first Gulf War.